Pace University

DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

6-15-2005

'Takings' Clarified: U.S. Supreme Court Provides Clear Direction
John R. Nolon
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University

Jessica A. Bacher
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Land Use Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John R. Nolon & Jessica A. Bacher, 'Takings' Clarified: U.S. Supreme Court Provides Clear Direction, N.Y.
L.J., June 15, 2005, at 5, http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/684/.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

Takings Clarified:
U.S. Supreme Court Provides Clear Direction
Written for Publication in the New York Law Journal
June 15, 2005

John R. Nolon and Jessica A. Bacher
[John Nolon is a Professor at Pace University School of Law, Counsel to its Land
Use Law Center, and Visiting Professor at Yale’s School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies. Jessica Bacher is an Adjunct Professor at Pace
University School of Law and a Staff Attorney for the Land Use Law Center.]
Abstracts: The United States Supreme Court holding in Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. clarified years of takings jurisprudence and overturned a
controversial decision in the case of Agins v. City of Tiburon. This article
discusses how the Lingle court denounced the “substantially advances” test
created in Agins, as a due process inquiry rather than a proper takings test. The
Lingle court instead opted to create a clear four-category paradigm for takings
cases, which focuses on the burden the government places on private property
rights in order to distinguish takings categories.
***
In the Supreme Court’s landmark decision Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 1
the Court untangled the web of regulatory taking jurisprudence. Much of the
murkiness in this area of law stems from the Court’s decision in Agins v. City of
Tiburon. 2 In Agins, the Court stated that a governmental regulation could be a
taking if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an
owner economically viable use of his land. This is a disjunctive test: if either
prong is violated, the Court said, a taking occurs and compensation is the proper
remedy.
In a unanimous decision, the Court held in Lingle that the Agins
“substantially advances” formula is not an appropriate test for determining
whether a regulation constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment. The
“formula prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings, test,
and . . . it has no proper place in . . . takings jurisprudence.” 3 The effect of the
Court’s holding and its explanatory dicta is to clarify greatly the field of regulatory
takings law as applied to land use regulations and agency determinations.
In Lingle, Chevron challenged a Hawaii statute that placed a cap on the
amount of rent an oil company may charge a lessee-dealer. Hawaii enacted Act
257 in June of 1997 in order to protect gasoline prices from inflation due to the
effects of market concentration. Chevron filed suit in the United States District

Court for the District of Hawaii claiming the Act effected a taking of its property
and sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction against the application of
the rent cap to its stations.
The parties stipulated “that Chevron has earned in the past, and
anticipates that it will continue to earn under Act 257, a return on its investment in
lessee-dealer stations in Hawaii that satisfies any constitutional standard.” 4
Patently, Act 257 did not effect a taking because it deprived Chevron of an
economically viable use of its property. After weighing the testimony of the
litigants’ dueling experts, the District Court held that the statute constituted an
unconstitutional taking because it did not achieve its intended objective and,
therefore, did not substantially advance a legitimate state interest. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation. “In other words, it ‘is
designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se,
but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference
amounting to a taking.” 5 “The paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation is
a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property.” 6
“Beginning with [Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.] Mahon, however, the Court
recognized that government regulation of private property may, in some
instances, be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or
ouster -- and that such ‘regulatory takings’ may be compensable under the Fifth
Amendment.” 7 In determining whether a regulation is a taking, the Court states
that “we must remain cognizant that ‘government regulation -- by definition -involves the adjustment of rights for the public good,’ and that ‘Government
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.’” 8
Four Categories of Takings Cases
The Court in Lingle identifies four categories of regulatory takings cases.
The tests created by the Court in each category aim to “identify regulatory
actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government
directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain.
Accordingly, each of these tests focuses directly upon the severity of the burden
that government imposes upon private property rights.” 9 The first two categories
are per se takings: void on their face without regard to the extent of their impact
on aggrieved property owners. “First, where government requires an owner to
suffer a permanent physical invasion of her property – however minor – it must
provide just compensation.” 10 “A second categorical rule applies to regulations
that completely deprive an owner of ‘all economically beneficial use’ of her
property.” 11 The third category, land use exactions, involves the imposition by a
land use approval board of a condition requiring a landowner dedicate an
easement allowing public access to her property – the effect of which is to oust

the landowner from a portion of her domain. 12 Within this category the Court’s
test is whether the condition advances the same public interest that would allow
the board to deny the application. It conducts a fact-based, or as applied, inquiry
to determine whether there is an essential nexus between the condition imposed
and the impact of the proposed development on the community.
“Outside these two ‘relatively narrow categories’ (and the special context
of land-use exactions . . . ) regulatory takings challenges are governed by the
standards set forth in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City.” 13 The Penn
Central “principal guidelines” are: the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant, particularly the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental
regulation. “[T]he Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not exclusively,
upon the magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it
interferes with legitimate property interests.” 14
In Lingle, the lower courts held that Act 257 is a taking because it fails to
meet the Agins “substantially advances” test. These courts held that the Act did
not substantially advance the legitimate state interest of controlling gasoline
prices. In arriving at its conclusion, the District Court weighed the
reasonableness of two opposing economists who testified on behalf of the
litigants; it found one expert’s views more persuasive than those of the other and
concluded that Act 257 would not achieve the objective of controlling gasoline
prices. In the Supreme Court’s own words, using the Agins test in this way
“would require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a vast array of state and federal
regulations -- a task for which courts are not well suited. Moreover, it would
empower -- and often require -- the courts to substitute their predictive judgments
for those of elected legislatures and expert agencies.” 15
According to the Court, the Agins test is “regrettably imprecise” and “such
a test is not a valid method of discerning whether private property has been
‘taken’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.” 16 “There is no question that the
‘substantially advances’ formula was derived from due process, not takings,
precedents.” 17 “[T]he ‘substantially advances’ inquiry reveals nothing about the
magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon
private property rights. Nor does it provide any information about how any
regulatory burden is distributed among property owners.” 18 “The notion that . . .
a regulation . . . ‘takes’ private property for public use merely by virtue of its
ineffectiveness or foolishness is untenable.” 19 The “takings Clause presupposes
that the government has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose.” 20
In reaching its conclusion to remove the Agins test from takings
jurisprudence, the Court held that it was not necessary to disturb any prior
holding because a taking has never been found based on the Agins inquiry.
Rather, the Court “correct[ed] course” by holding that the “substantially
advances” formula is not a valid taking test.

Applicable Tests
Per se cases: The Lingle roadmap to regulatory takings provides
practitioners and scholars with clear directions. There are two types of per se
takings, where no factual investigation of the extent of the regulatory burden is
required. The first of these is where a regulation invades the owner’s exclusive
right of possession. The seminal Supreme Court case in this category, where
attorneys may turn for specific guidance, is Loretto v. Telemprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp. 21 The second per se category involves regulations that deny
property owners all economically beneficial use of their property. The applicable
test here is contained in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 22
As applied cases: The two other categories of regulatory takings involve
“as applied” investigations where the court examines the extent of the burden
imposed and the character of the regulation involved. Where land use agencies,
in their adjudicative role, impose conditions that require owners to allow the
public on their land, courts must determine whether there is an essential nexus
and rough proportionality between the condition imposed and the impact of the
proposed development on the public. Cases clarifying the rules within this
category are Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n 23 and Dolan v. City of Tigard. 24
The Lingle Court explains that Nollan and Dolan “involve a special application of
the ‘doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,' which provides that ‘the government
may not require a person to give up a constitutional right -- here the right to
receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use -- in exchange
for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit has
little or no relationship to the property.’” 25 “In short, Nollan and Dolan cannot be
characterized as applying the ‘substantially advances’ test we address today,
and our decision should not be read to disturb these precedents.” 26 The second
category in the “as applied” realm involves a balancing of factors, under the Penn
Central test - notably the character of the challenged regulation and extent to
which the regulation interferes with the owner’s distinct investment-backed
expectations.
“Deprivation” Cases – The Due Process Clause
In Lingle, the Court further clarified that the Due Process Clause of the
U.S. Constitution gives rise to an entirely separate body of case law, involving
distinct tests, that can be used to challenge land use regulations. This clause
states that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. In
dicta, the Lingle Court reminds us that “a regulation that fails to serve any
legitimate governmental objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs
afoul of the Due Process Clause.” 27 Since 1894, under Lawton v. Steele 28 the
Court has applied a “deferential ‘reasonableness’ standard to determine whether
a challenged regulation was a ‘valid exercise of the . . . police power’ under the
Due Process Clause.” 29

In the more recent County of Sacramento v. Lewis 30 case, the Court noted
that the Due Process Clause protects property owners against “the exercise of
power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate
governmental objective.” 31 Justice Kennedy writes a concurring opinion in Lingle
to emphasize that the Court’s opinion “does not foreclose the possibility that a
regulation might be so arbitrary or irrational as to violate due process.” 32 In
Lingle, the due process claim had been voluntarily dismissed by Chevron, so the
Court did not address whether such a case existed.
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